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Abstract
Models of electoral agency address the levels of discipline and selec-
tion that voters can acheive in elections. The models are demanding
in terms of individual belief-formation and consistency of behavior.
We investigate a baseline model of electoral agency in a controlled
laboratory environment. This baseline model, although simple, forms
the central plank of more complex electoral agency models. Our de-
sign seeks to limit the behavioral impact of social preferences. We
nd little support for the baseline model in our data. However, simple
(nonrational) learning rules explain behavioral patterns well. Simula-
tions indicate that non-rational learning drives behavior most force-
fully towards equilibrium in situations that are favorable to Bayesian
updating.
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Introduction
In representative democracies voters have the option to condition reelection
on the observed performance of incumbents. Regular access to elections al-
lows voters to "throw out the rascals" peacefully. Arguably this is the den-
ing characteristic of democratic government (Hayek 1979:137; Riker 1982:9;
Popper 1989:344; Schumpeter 1996:284-5). Identifying conditions that enable
voters to retain or replace incumbent rulers in intelligent ways is therefore
an exercise worth taking.
Current electoral agency models assign voters the twin tasks of disciplin-
ing bad incumbents, and selecting good incumbents (Austen-Smith & Banks
1989; Banks & Sundaram 1993; Besley 2006; Fearon 1999; Maskin & Tirole
2004).1 There is a trade-o¤ between the two; better selection comes only at
the cost of weakened discipline - and vice versa. This trade-o¤ places sig-
nicant demands on voters. Beliefs are required to be consistently updated
given observed outcomes, and votes are required to be optimal given such
beliefs.
Taken literally, electoral agency models make unrealistic behavioral claims
on voters. While guring out the strategic complexities will carries signicant
cognitive costs, the expected return of informed voting is at best marginal
in realistically sized electorates (Downs 1957:244-5; cfr. Caplan 2007:2). In
short, there are few incentives for voters to behave in rationally informed
ways. Politicians, on the other hand, who stand to win or loose positions in
high o¢ ce, have high powered incentives to acquire relevant information and
act rationally on it.
In the article we investigate voter behavior in a simple electoral agency
experiment. Taking Besleys core model (2006:185-8) as our starting point,
we seek to identify conditions under which less than rational learning rules
converge on, or diverge from, the equilibrium of this model.
Our design captures the asymmetric incentives of voters and politicians
with regard to making informed choices. In the experiment politicians are
automatons, while voters are human subjects.2 The automatons are pro-
1First generation models of electoral agency, such as Barro 1973 and Ferejohn 1986,
focus exclusively on discipline, since all politicians are "bad" (in the sense of maximizing
a combination of rents and o¢ ce).
2The use of automatons is common in election experiments, and abundant in the litera-
ture on positioning in two candidate contests (in which voters are habitually programmed
to vote for the candidate closest to own ideal point). For an overview see Ordeshook 1997.
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grammed to mimic the equilibrium behavior of politicians in the electoral
agency model that is tested. Thus, we explore the behavior of subjects as
voters in a (highly articial) situation where it is public knowledge that politi-
cians behave in a manner fully consistent with the electoral agency model.
As is well known, systematic deviations from self interested equilibrium
are explained by fairness preferences and intentions-based reciprocity in a
number of simple games (see Fehr 2009; Bolton et al. 2009 for reviews).
Insofar as such motivations are not part of the agency model we explore, we
wish to minimize their behavioral impact. The use of politician-automatons
renders intention-based subject responses unlikely (since a computer program
does not have intentions). By design there is no payo¤variation among voters
belonging to the same electorate in our experiments; fairness concerns are
therefore not likely to come in to play.3 By controlling for fairness preferences
and intentions in this way, our design allow us to explore the learning rules
in an environment in which self-regarding voter responses are cultivated. It
also allows us to draw rmer conclusions about learning in an environment
that closely resembles that of the agency model we are studying.
While there have been numerous eld data tests of electoral agency mod-
els (Besley, Persson & Stürm 2010; Svensson 1999; Helland & Sørensen 2011;
Petterson-Lidbom (2006); Svaleryd & Vlachos (2009), and more indirectly by
Alesina, Bakir and Easterly 1999; Easterly and Levine 1997; cfr. Persson &
Tabellini 2000:90), it is di¢ cult to draw clear-cut causal inferences from them
(due to e.g. institutional heterogeneity of polities; measurement problems on
key variables; thorny questions of reversed causation; endogeneity; and selec-
tion bias). The experimental method allows a greater degree of direct control
of the central building blocks of agency models (e.g. voter preferences; be-
liefs; electoral institutions; and incumbency performance), and (partly for
this reason) facilitates inferences about causal mechanisms. The price paid
is uncertainty with respect to external validity. In our opinion experiments
can provide a useful supplement to eld data studies, not least, we believe,
in the study of electoral agency.
A number of experiments deal with elections.4 Only a minority investi-
A more recent example is found in Aragones & Palfrey (2005), which we discuss below.
3We do not provide information on earnings in other groups; inequality concerns based
on the population of subject do not, therefore, enter into the frame.
4Beginning in the late1980s, a number of papers explored convergence towards the me-
dian voter in two-candidate majoritarian elections (see Ordeshook 1997 for an overview).
From the early 1990s onwards, a series of studies demonstrated how various pre-election
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gate agency problems. Markussen & Tyran (2009) use an agency framework
to study selection of politicians, given two kinds of signals about potential
candidates (contributions in a public goods game, and score on an IQ-test).
Discipline is not an issue in their experiment, since there is no reelection;
rather it was designed to explore the impact of fairness preferences on selec-
tion.
Aragones & Palfrey (2005) and Houser, Morton & Stratman (2008) run
experiments on selection of politicians who di¤er in (exogenously given)
types. These experiments do not depart from an explicit agency frame-
work (but utilizes variants of prospective voting models). Elections are not
repeated, so issues of discipline do not enter here either.
Dasgupta & Williams (2002) study comes closest to our own, in that
they also approach the twin challenges of discipline and selection. In their
setup voters are subdivided into two groups; one group is informed about
policy outcomes produced by the current incumbent, the other group is not.
Informed voters observe outcomes with noise (since outcomes are a function
of randomly drawn competence and incumbent e¤ort choice). After the noisy
signals have been transmitted to informed voters, all voters participate in a
xed number of polls. Each aggregate polling result is made public knowledge
once it is concluded. Voters thereafter either reelect or oust the current
incumbent. Since getting reelected is valuable, discipline therefore enters
as a relevant concern. Selection is also a concern because the incumbent
and challenger will have di¤erent policy preferences, and possibly also di¤er
in terms of their qualities. Given the sequence of polls, uninformed voters
may update by observing the poll results.5 Voters and politicians are human
subjects in the experiment.
Now, although the setup is one of incomplete voter information, Dasgupta
& Williams (2002) nd that voters behave as if they were fully informed.
There are two reasons for this; informed voters are able to extract information
from their noisy signal; and uninformed voters in turn are able to extract
this information from aggregate polls. Two alternative "attention rules" are
explored: (a) no learning related to output or polls; (b) rational learning
related to output but no learning related to polls. None of these alternatives
signals can help voters eliminate Condorcet loosers in three candidate contests under single
member majority rule (see Reitz 2009 for an overview). There is also a growing experi-
mental literature on turnout in elections (a brief overview is provided by Sonnemans &
Schram 2009).
5In the manner suggested by McKelvey & Ordeshook (1985).
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explain the data as well as the alternative in which voters learn rationally
from both sources.
The possibility of voters learning from both polls and observed outcomes,
but in ways other than by consistently applying Bayesrule is not considered.
Our experiment shows that non-rational learning rules may, but need not,
converge on a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in an agency setting. This sug-
gests that the results in Dasgupta & Williams (2002) need not necessarily
have been produced by the mechanism underlying a rational expectations
equilibrium, and that convergence on equilibrium need not happen for other
parameters in their experiment. In short, while Dasgupta & Williams (2002)
ask if voters learn to play the equilibrium in an agency environment, we ask
how and when voters learn to play an equilibrium in such an environment.6
The explanatory force of the electoral agency model we are studying
hinges critically on voters being able to update beliefs in accordance with
Bayes rule. There is an experimental literature on individuals ability to
perform such updates. What one nd is that individuals perform Bayesian
calculations signicantly better when the problem is presented in terms of
frequencies, rather than probabilities (see Gigerenzer et al. 2009 for an
overview). To give Bayesian updating a fair chance, therefore, we gave the
subjects in our experiment their decision problems in frequency terms. The
frequencies versus probability literature, however, focuses on one-shot indi-
vidual decision problems. We explore a richer environment, in which learning
takes place in a strategic context.
With Bayesian learning as a point of departure, we check the explanatory
power of two non-rational learning rules: ctitious play learning (Brown 1951)
and payo¤reinforcement learning (Erev &Roth 1995). As Colin Camerer and
Teck Ho (1999) have demonstrated, ctitious play and payo¤ reinforcement
learning are both special cases of a more general learning model ("experience
weighted attraction"). Rather than relying on Camerer and Hos rather
heavily parametrized model, we follow the simpler twin rule approach. This
choice is grounded in improved tractability, as well as previous explanatory
success of these simpler rules.
While we nd little support for the electoral agency model in our data,
simple (nonrational) learning rules do explain behavioral patterns well. More-
6A possible weakness in the Dasgupta & Williams (2002) design is it failure to (attempt
to) control for social preferences (which we know are foreceful drivers of behavior in a large
class of other experiments).
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over, simulations indicate that non-rational learning drives behavior most
forcefully toward equilibrium in situations that are favorable to Bayesian up-
dating. In situations that are less favorable to Bayesian updating, behavior
stabilizes away from equilibrium.
It would be pertinent question to ask whether foresighted politicians fac-
ing non-rational voters would continue to behave as stipulated by the elec-
toral agency model. Departing from our experimental results, we argue that
selection pressures limit the extent to which sophisticated politicians can take
advantage of non-rational voters.
The paper is organized as follows: The model is presented in the next
section, followed by an outline of the design. Next, results are presented in
some detail. Limits on sophisticated politicians are discussed prior to a brief
conclusion.7
Model
Write individual utility as wt = (1   )y + xt, were y is pre tax income,
 an endogenously given tax rate, xt public output in stage t 2 f1; 2g, and
 > 1.
The public budget is required to balance in each stage, so that  (y   rt) =
xt. In the budget restriction  2 fs; 1g, 0 < s < 1 is a persistent productivity
shock, and 0 < rt  R  y is rent extraction in stage t.8 It is also required
that R > (1   s)y, as a technical assumption. Productivity is drawn from
the distribution Pr( = s) = q, and Pr( = 1) = (1  q). Only the case with
q  1
2
is analyzed.9
Let there be two types of politicians  2 fg; bg, referred to as "good"
and "bad" respectively. The types have objective functions vg = w1 + w2
and vb = r1 + r2, where  < 1 is a common discount factor. Let the prior
distribution of types be given by Pr( = g) = , and Pr( = b) = (1  ).
The following time line applies: 1) Incumbent-type and productivity are
drawn, and observed by the incumbent only. 2) The incumbent sets rent
extraction for stage one. Production is determined residually. 3) Stage one
payo¤s are distributed, and observed by all players. 4) Elections are held
7Instructions are provided at: http://home.bi.no/a0111218/EA_JTP_Instructions.pdf
8Persistent in the sense of persisting through the election.
9This eliminates a hybrid equilibrium, in which voters and incumbents randomize over
pure actions.
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at the end of stage one; they determine wether the current incumbent is
kept or replaced by the challenger. If the challenger wins, he observes the
productivity draw from the rst stage, and his type is drawn and observed
by him only. 5) The (re) elected politician sets rent extraction for stage two.
6) Stage two payo¤s are distributed and the game ends.
As is immediately clear, in stage two (the last stage), a bad politician
extracts maximal rents while a good politician extracts zero rents. Since
good politicians never steal, they will either produce x1 = y or x1 = sy,
depending on the realization of the productivity draw. For any other level
of production, it must be the case that Pr(gjx1) = 0. Since future rents are
discounted, r1 = R dominates r1 = 0 for a bad politician (irrespective of
productivity r1 = R pays (1 + )R if reelected and R if not, while r1 = 0
pays R if reelected and 0 if not).
A bad politician facing  = 1 may nevertheless nd it worthwhile to
mimic a good politician facing  = s. This will net the bad politician r1 =
(1  s)y, in addition to R if he is reelected. Denote the probability that a
bad politician extracts r1 = (1  s)y by .
Attention is limited to the use of pure cut-o¤ strategies by the voters.
These strategies instruct the voter to reelect if and only if the updated belief
in the current incumbent being good is at least as high as the probability
of the challenger being good. The voters updated belief of having a good
incumbent after observing x1 = sy follows from Bayesrule:
 =
q
q + (1  q)(1  ) (1)
After observing x1 = sy the voter follows his pure cut-o¤ strategy and
reelects if and only if   , or equivalently if and only if   q
(1 q) . Thus,
for q  1
2
(which is the case analyzed), reelection is certain after x1 = sy
has been observed. Let 0 <  < 1 signify the probability that the incumbent
is reelected.
It is easy to see that a separating equilibrium (with  = 1 and  = 0)
exists if y(1 s)+R < R, and that a pooling equilibrium (with  =  = 1)
exists if y(1  s) + R  R.
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Design
In all sessions of the experiment we held the following parameters constant:
s = 0:5 ("low productivity draw"); y = 100 schillings ("endowment per
stage");  = 0:5 ("tax rate");  = 1:1 ("marginal value of public produc-
tion");  = 0:2 ("a priory probability of a good politician").
Sessions were conducted with electorate size 1 ("decisive voter") and 3
("deciding by simple majority"), to check for learning e¤ects due to group
decision making (which should be nil according to the model), and di¤erences
with respect to electorate size (which also should be nil according to the
model).
For each electorate size we performed a session with marginal updating in
which q = 0:55) ( ) = 0:03, and a sessions with substantial updating in
which q = 0:85) ( ) = 0:39. The idea was to check whether equilibrium
behavior requires substantial updating.
In each game, after observing rst stage production, subjects were re-
quired to register their subjective probability assessment that the rst stage
politician was bad. Within each session subjects were informed that the mini-
mal absolute deviation between registered beliefs and actual draws would win
a price of 500 Norwegian Kroner (NOK), and that a fair lottery would pick
a winner in case of a non-unique minimum.
Incumbent behavior was programmed in the computer (rather than hav-
ing voters face humans in the role of politicians). The programmed behavior
was as follows: If good type and  = 1, allocate 50 schillings to public pro-
duction in both stages; if good type and  = 0:5 allocate 25 schillings to
public production in both stages; if bad type and  = 1 allocate 25 schillings
to public production in stage one and nothing in stage two; if bad type and
 = 0:5 allocate nothing to public production in either stage.
In the 3-subject electorates we employed an absolute stranger design (in
which no subject was matched with subjects whom this subject had been
matched with in previous games). This imposed a limit on the number
of feasible repetitions with the 3-subject electorates, which is 7. With 1-
subject electorates no such limit is imposed; this allows for more repetitions
to check whether behavior settles down over time. In sessions with 1-subject
electorates therefore, we ran the game with 20 repetitions. The design is
summarized in table 1.
The design had two desiderata: a) root out social preferences; and b) pro-
duce statistically independent observations. Since incumbents are machines,
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Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4
Date 26 Nov 07 27 Nov 07 26 Oct 08 29 Oct 08
Electorate size 3 3 1 1
Number of subjects 18 18 20 20
Updating Marginal Substantial Marginal Substansial
 = 0:03  = 0:39  = 0:03  = 0:39
Matching Absolute Absolute Not Not
stranger stranger relevant relevant
Number of
games played 7 7 20 20
Table 1: Design.
not humans, there is no sense in punishing or rewarding past behavior. In
sessions 1 and 2 every electorate is unique due to an absolute stranger design.
There is no sense in trying to punish or reward other subjects for previous
play, since this can not possibly have any disciplining e¤ects that the subject
may benet from (he or she does not meet the punished or rewarded subject
again). In sessions 1 and 2 majority decision ensures that all subjects in
the same electorate earn the same amount in a specic game. No subject
belonging to the same electorate is therefore ever ahead or behind any other
subject. In the decisive voter treatments (session 3 and 4) no information
on other subjects earnings was made available. Social preferences based on
inequality aversion (or more generally, preferences for nal earnings distrib-
utions) should consequently have no e¤ect in the experiment. Due to the use
of an absolute stranger design in sessions 1 and 2 we can also be condent
that observations of electorates are statistically independent.
The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher 1999). After
subjects had entered the lab, instructions where read out loud (to ensure
public knowledge of the structure of the interaction). Each session started
with two non-paying test games to familiarize subjects with the game and
the screens. All communication between subjects during the experiment took
place through the computers. After concluding a session, subjects left the
lab one at a time and received their earnings.
The experimental "schillings" where converted at a xed rate to NOK at
the conclusion of the experiment, and the subjects were paid in cash. There
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was no show up fee, and the average pay over all treatments was 207 NOK.10
A session lasted on average 45 minutes, so average pay is slightly above the
going optional hourly wage of a typical BA student.
In equilibrium voters should oust rst stage incumbents that do not allo-
cate tax revenues to public production, and (given the update) should keep
rst stage incumbents that do allocate tax revenues to public production.
Behaviorally, one would expect voters to be quite good at keeping incum-
bents after observing 50 schillings of st stage public production, and to
throw incumbents out after observing 0 schillings of rst stage production.
The case of a rst stage production equal to 25 schillings could either be due
to a good incumbent facing a low productivity draw, or to a bad incumbent
facing a high productivity draw (and mimicking a good incumbent). The
conjecture is that the size of the update will determine the extent to which
voters keep the incumbent when rst stage production was 25 schillings.
One should also expect voters to approach equilibrium over time, possibly
through non-rational forms of learning. Indeed nonrational forms of learning
may arguably have a greater impact on behavior for marginal updates than
for substantial updates. Lastly, decisions made by subjects in electorates are
expected to be closer to equilibrium, than decisions made by subjects operat-
ing as decisive voters. Electorates provide a richer learning environment, in
which subjects may correct their behavior based on observing whether they
were in the minority or not.
Results
Results are presented in four sections. First,we provide some descriptive sta-
tistics. This is followed by non-parametric tests for the e¤ects of learning
in groups versus learning alone, and for the e¤ects of playing early games
versus late games. Third, we present a set of regressions that evaluate the
e¤ects of two non-rational learning rules; ctitious play and simple payo¤
reinforcement is presented. Lastly, we explore the e¤ects of payo¤ reinforce-
ment learning in the experiment by running some simulations.
10The exchange was reduced in long sessions, to produce an expected pay of 200 NOK
in all sessions.
10
Descriptive statistics
Due to the stochastic nature of the game, the distribution of rst stage pro-
duction is not balanced. Table 2 shows how observations are distributed on
treatments and rst stage production (denoted by P1=0, P1=25 and P1=50
respectively). Note also that the fraction of nonequilibrium decisions varies
between 28 percent and 20 percent in the data, depending on treatments.
While larger updates result in more equilibrium behavior for decisive voters,
the opposite is the case for voters in electorates.
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4
P1=0 72 90 190 272
P1=25 36 36 182 115
P1=50 18 0 28 13
Share of
equilibrium decisions .80 .75 .72 .75
Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Rational learning and group learning
We start by looking at the e¤ects of update-size on decisive voters, and on
voters in electorates. The relevant data are displayed in gure 1.
[Figure 1 about here]
The bars show the fraction of decisive voters and the fraction of voters
in electorates, who decided to keep the incumbent, contingent on rst stage
production.11 Due to few observations at rst stage production level equal
to 50, we do not comment on the patterns in this state.
When P1=25, decisive voters are generally more likely than voters in
electorates to keep incumbents. This holds for both marginal update (12
percentage points di¤erence) and substantial update (15 percentage points
di¤erence). However, none of these di¤erences are statistically di¤erent from
11Results remains qualitatively similar if we instead analyze average voting decisions of
subjects.
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zero in a two sided Mann-Whitney U-test (z=-1.12, p>0.26 for marginal
update; z=-1.36, p>0.17 for substantial update).
In both group treatments (decisive voters versus electorates) increasing
the update (from marginal to substantial) increases the fraction of incum-
bents kept at P1=25. In the treatment with decisive voters the increase is
17 percentage points, against 14 percentage points in the treatment with
electorates. However, only the former di¤erence is statistically di¤erent from
zero in a two sided Mann-Whitney U-test (z=1.68, p>0.09 for decisive voters;
z=-1.17, p>0.24 for electorates).
On the other hand, decisive voters are signicantly worse at ousting in-
cumbents that P1=0, than voters operating in electorates. This holds for
both marginal and substantial updates (z=1.98, p>0.05 for marginal update;
z=-3.28, p>0.000 for substantial update).
We turn now to the e¤ects of update-size in early versus late games.
The analysis is conned to voting decisions of decisive voters, since a greater
number of games was played in this group treatment. The relevant data are
displayed in gure 2.
[Figure 2 about here]
Focus on voting contingent on having observed P1=25. The di¤erence
between substantial and marginal update in the rst ve games is 0.24, com-
pared to 0.26 in the ve last games. These di¤erences are signicant in both
cases (z=1.89, p>0.06 rst ve games; z=2.48, p>0.01 last ve games).
Consider now learning e¤ects. The di¤erence in votes to keep the incum-
bent between the last ve and the rst ve games is 8 percentage points
when the update is marginal, and 14 percentage points when it is substan-
tial. None of these movements towards equilibrium, however, is signicantly
di¤erent from zero (z=-0.73, p>0.46 for marginal update; z=-1.20, p>0.23
for substantial update).
As is also evident from gure 2, more incumbents are ousted after P1=0
in the last ve games (for both marginal and substantial update), than in
the rst ve games. This pattern is signicantly di¤erent from zero at con-
ventional levels (z=1.77, p>0.08 for marginal update; z=-2.60, p>0.01 for
substantial update)
All in all, these non-parametric tests indicate that allowing for substantial
updating does facilitate movement towards equilibrium, but not a whole lot,
and not always in statistically signicant ways. Second, membership of an
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electorate does not seem to induce group learning that improves the ability
to make equilibrium choices. Third, the learning e¤ects of decisive voters are
modest, and not signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels.
Table 3 displays the absolute deviance between registered beliefs and equi-
librium beliefs, contingent on update size; rst stage production; and group
treatment. As can be seen the di¤erences between decisive voters and voters
in electorates are small for P1=25. The average deviation between registered
beliefs and equilibrium beliefs, however, is quite large for this production
level. For decisive voters average mistakes at P1=25 increases on transition
from marginal to substantial update. For voters in electorates the opposite
is the case. As can be seen the rst e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero in a two sided test, while the last one is. For observed P1=0, average
mistakes are smaller. However, these mistakes grow with the size of the up-
date for both decisive voters and voters in electorates, and the di¤erences are
signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels. All in all, the pattern
of registered beliefs seriously challenges the conjecture that subjects form
beliefs in accordance with the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the electoral
agency model. It also challenges the conjecture that Bayesian belief forma-
tion is more pronounced when observations give rise to substantial updates.
Decisive voters
Substantial Marginal
update update MW U-test
P1=00 12.1 8.3 z=-2.56, p>0.01
P1=25 25.9 28.6 z=0.02, p>0.99
P1=50 30.4 37.5 z=0.53, p>0.57
Electorates
Substantial Marginal
update update MW U-test
P1=00 11.3 1.0 z=-4.65, p>0.00
P1=25 25.0 23.4 z=-1.61, p>0.11
P1=50 - 27.2 -
Table 3: Absolute deviations between registered beliefs and equilibrium beliefs.
Averaged over registered beliefs
Can behavior based on payo¤ reinforcements and ctitious play updating
help us understand behavior better?
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Non-rational learning
The ctitious play update is a continuous variable constructed as follows.
The belief that one is facing a good incumbent in game t equals
Prt(G) =
wt 1(G)
wt 1(G) + wt 1(B)
(2)
Let w0(G) =  = 0:2 and w0(B) = (1   ) = 0:8. The following counting
rules are used. i) If P1=50 (0) this counts as a good (bad) incumbent. ii) If
P1=25 and the incumbent was reelected, a positive (negative) stage 2 pro-
duction counts as a good (bad) incumbent. iii) If the incumbent was ousted
a positive (negative) stage 2 production counts as a good (bad) incumbent.
Note that two counts of a good politician, two counts of a bad politician,
or one count of a bad and one count of a good politician, are all possible
if the stage 1 incumbent was ousted. Employing these counting rules, the
weighting function follows the formula: wt(G) = wt 1(G) + f; f = (1; 2)
if conclusive evidence of a good incumbent in game t was observed, and
wt(G) = wt 1(G) + 0 if no such evidence was observed in game t. The
weighting function for a bad incumbent (wt(B)) is dened similarly. Now
dene a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if Prt(GjP1 > 0) > 0:2 or
Prt(GjP1 = 0)  0:2, and zero otherwise. In words, the dummy takes value
1 if ctitious beliefs favors equilibrium actions, and zero otherwise. This
dummy is denoted d(Fictitious).
The payo¤ reinforcement variable is calculated on state dependent ac-
tions. That is, reelecting or throwing the incumbent has numerical attrac-
tions that depend on the information set the subject is in. There are six
attractions, given by the two possible actions (reelect or oust) in each of the
three states (rst stage production 0, 25, or 50 respectively). Let qi;t(a; s)
denote the attraction action a has for player i at time t, given that the real-
ized state was s. Let the payo¤ to player i of choosing action a in state s be
b. The attraction of action a in state s is updated according to the following
rule: qi;t+1(a; s)=qi;t(a; s) + b. The probability that player i chooses action
a0 in state s at time t is simply
pi;t(a
0; s) =
qi;t(a
0; s)P
a2A[qi;t(a; s)]
(3)
To facilitate interpretation of reinforcement toward equilibrium, the variable
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used is coded as follows: Reinforcement=(pi;t(Keep; P1 > 0) and (1  
pi;t(Keep; P1 = 0)).
The sketched learning rule raises two important questions. How are initial
attractions to be determined (i.e. in period t=1)? At what level should the
strengthof initial attractions be set? The strength of initial attractions is
dened as
P
a2A[qi;t(a; s)].
Following Roth & Erev (1995), initial attractions are estimated from data
using only the rst two games, with the strength of initial attractions set at
the same order of magnitude as the maximal value of periodic production
in the game, i.e. 55. Table 4 provides the fraction of votes for and against
the incumbent in the two rst games, in the three di¤erent states. These
correspond to the estimates of (state-contingent) initial choice probabilities.
(The initial attractions follow readily from this estimate, and the strength of
attraction).
First stage production P1=00 P1=25 P1=50
Keep incumbent .167 .481 .600
(9.19) (26.46) (33.00)
Oust incumbent .833 .519 .400
(45.82) (28.55) (22.00)
Table 4: Initial choice probabilities (initial attractions).
Table 5 presents a set of logistical regression. We estimate the (log odds)
that decisions are in equilibrium. That is, the dependent is a dummy that
takes the value zero if rst stage production was zero and the incumbent
was voted out of o¢ ce, or if rst-stage production was positive and the
incumbent was kept. Otherwise the dependent has the value 1. The following
explanatory variables are used: subjects sex; a dummy variable (d(Update))
that takes the value zero in session 3 (marginal updating) and 1 in session
4 (substantial updating); dummy variables for rst-stage production equal
to 25 (d(P1 = 25)) and 50 (d(P1 = 50)) respectively; the dummy that
captures ctitious play; the variable that captures reinforcement learning. In
addition the production dummies are interacted with the dummy for sessions
(d(Update)).12
12We also ran regressions in which we let the non-rational belief formation variables
interact with the update dummy. The exercise did not a¤ect our results.
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Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
Sex .13 .12 .13 .11
(.66) (.37) (.63) (.38)
d(Update) -1.12 -1.19 -1.11 -1.14
(.003) (.006) (.003) (.005)
d(P1 = 25) -2.83 -3.07 -1.12 -1.52
(.000) (.000) (.023) (.003)
d(P1 = 50) -2.16 -2.28 -1.14 -1.38
(.000) (.000) (.044) (.014)
d(P1 = 25)d(Update) 1.62 1.74 1.28 1.42
(.000) (.000) (.005) (.002)
d(P1 = 50)d(Update) 2.08 2.26 2.15 2.34
(.030) (.017) (.024) (.012)
d(Fictitious) - - .12 .13
(.545) (.535)
Reinforcement - - 4.51 3.81
(.000) (.000)
Constant 2.80 3.03 -1.18 -.044
(.000) (.000) (.170) (.636)
Deviance 749.8 650.8 720.4 650.3
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Random e¤ects NO YES NO YES
Subjects - .53 - .33
Games - .15 - .14
Number of observations 800 800 800 800
Table 5: Dependent: Correspondence with equilibrium. Logistical regressions.
Decisive voters. Coe¢ cients (p-values).
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The rst two models (1a and 1b) do not account for non-rational learning
rules. Results broadly conrms one of the ndings shown in gures 1 and
2. Consider model 1b, where we control for random e¤ects of subjects and
game (i.e. time). The regression says that going from marginal to substan-
tial update at P1= 25, drives behavior toward equilibrium. The combined
e¤ect (taking the interactive term into account) is 0.55, corresponding to an
increase in the probability of keeping the incumbent of 13 percentage points
if sex is set to one (from 52 percent for marginal update, to 65 percent for
substantial update). This combined e¤ect is also close to signicantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 10 percent level, with a p-value of .106.13 A similar
analysis of the update e¤ect at P1=50 reveals a positive e¤ect that is far
from signicantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels.
The two last models (2a and 2b) controls for non-rational learning rules.
Consider model 2b, where random e¤ects are controlled for. Going from mar-
ginal to substantial update at P1=25, pushes behavior toward equilibrium
again. The combined e¤ect in this case is 0.26, or roughly half before control
for non-rational learning rules. If reinforcement is held at its mean value,
while the dummies for ctitious play,update and sex are set to 1, it corre-
sponds to an increase in the probability of equilibrium voting of 7 percentage
points. However, this combined e¤ect is far from signicantly di¤erent from
zero at conventional levels, with a p-value of .38. The dummy for ctitious
play is small in magnitude, and clearly insignicant.
However, the reinforcement variable has a positive, large, and strongly
signicant e¤ect on the probability of making equilibrium choices. Substan-
tially, the probability of making an equilibrium choice after observing P1=25
is 45 percent if reinforcement is set at its mean minus two standard devia-
tions, it is 68 percent if reinforcement is set at its mean (0.58), and 85 percent
if reinforcement is set at its mean plus two standard deviations. In the cal-
culation, the dummies for ctitious play, update and sex are once again set
to 1. The standard deviation of Reinforcement for these controls is 0.13.14
The main message boils down to this: The last trace of rational updating
disappears when it is controlled for the very simplistic (almost Pavlovian)
13The t-test in this case is a joint test of d(Update), d(P1=25) and the interaction
between these two variables. Details about these tests can be found in Kam & Franzese
2007:111-30.
14All the conclusions drawn so far, would also follow had we interpreted regressions 1a
and 2a instead of 1b and 2b.
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learning rule in which past payo¤s reinforce current choices.15.
Long run e¤ects of payo¤ reinforcement
We explore in this section the long run behavior of payo¤reinforcement learn-
ing in the game. Figures 3 and 4 show simulation results for substantial and
marginal updates respectively, when behavior is driven by payo¤ reinforce-
ment only. The randomness and payo¤s of these simulations are identical to
those of the experiments. We used the same initial choice probabilities, and
the same strength of attractions as in the regressions. An individual that
plays a sequence of 1,000 independent games is simulated. The simulations
are averages of 10,000 draws of such sequences. The gure maps the average
fraction of decisions in equilibrium (y-axis) for the sequence of games (x-axis)
and for each of the three states (red, blue and black curves). 90 percent con-
dence intervals are attached to the behavioral paths (shaded red, blue and
black curves).16
[Figure 3 about here]
The main insight from these simulations is that behavior moves (asymp-
totically) toward equilibrium (but never quite reaches it for P1>0) in the
substantial update condition (gure 3). This is very di¤erent from the mar-
ginal update condition (gure 4), in which behavior contingent on observing
P1=25 diverges (slowly) from equilibrium. The reason is quite simple: in the
substantial update condition keeping the incumbent provides a (posterior)
probability (after observing P1=25) of 59 percent for a positive second stage
payo¤. In the marginal update condition keeping the incumbent provides a
(posterior) probability (after observing P1=25) of only 23 percent for a pos-
itive second stage payo¤. So, high posterior probability of a good incumbent
reinforces the choice of keeping the incumbent, and pushes behavior towards
equilibrium.
15Comparing regressions 1b and 2b, we also see that random time e¤ects are fairly
constant (0.15 compared to 0.14), and that the main di¤erence is captured by within-
subjects variation as we control for non-rational learning rules (0.52 compared to 0.33).
This should come as no surprise. In regression 2b we introduced randomly generated
histories at the subject level, which gave rise to random variation in the non-rational
learning rules.
16Figures for individual learning paths in the marginal and substantial treatments are
available at http://home.bi.no/a0111218/IndividualLearningFigures_EA.pdf
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In the event then, observing higher levels of equilibrium behavior at
P1=25 for substantial updates by no means implies that the mechanism
(perfect Bayesian equilibrium) identied in the basic electoral agency model
is at work. Exactly the same conditions - clear and strong Bayesian updat-
ing - will also reinforce behavior towards equilibrium in a Pavlovian manner.
The condence intervals around the behavioral path at P1=25, indicate the
experiment had too few rounds for this e¤ect to be pronounced. Still, as
noted, the regressions weed out all trace of Bayesian updating after control
for reinforcement learning.
In appendix 2 we show evolving choice probabilities based on simple pay-
o¤ reinforcement for the 40 subjects in sessions 3 (marginal update) and 4
(substantial update). As can be seen the choice probabilities given produc-
tion equal to 25 schillings, tend to converge more towards equilibrium in
session 4 than in session 3.
Limits on sophisticated politicians
Assume voter behavior is fully described by the simple payo¤ reinforcement
rule. Assume also that the utility of bad incumbents increases linearly in
rents. Consider a bad type of incumbent who has drawn high productivity.
If she takes maximal rents, her prot is 50 schillings o¤ the bat. According
to our ndings, in the long run voters will not reelect incumbents with zero
value in their public production. Thus the incumbents prot is 50 schillings.
Alternatively, the bad type incumbent might mimic a good type incumbent
facing a low productivity draw. In this case, her rst period rent is 25
schillings, while her second period expected rent is Q50 schillings, where Q
signies the reelection probability in this case, and  < 1 is a discount factor.
The bad incumbent only mimics if Q  1
2
. For the sake of the argument,
simplify by letting  be arbitrarily close to unity.
Consider rst the case pictured in gure 3. In this case, the mimic con-
dition is always satised, and behavior approaches the equilibrium of the
electoral agency model in the long run.
Consider now the case pictured in gure 4. Assume the mimic condition
is not satised. Given rst-stage production equalling 25, all second-stage
outcomes following reelection will be good ones. This drives up reelection
probability, Q, through the payo¤ reinforcement rule. Eventually, Q will
reach the threshold of 0.5 where bad type incumbents start to mimic good
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ones. A fraction ((1-q)(1-)) of bad second-stage outcomes will follow reelec-
tion after observing rst stage production equalling 25 schillings. This lowers
Q through the payo¤ reinforcement rule. If the mimic condition is satised
initially, a mirror argument ensures that Q is driven towards 1
2
from above.
In the upshot, two forces limit the ability of bad incumbents to take
advantage of non-rational voters. First, payo¤ reinforcement learning is not
exposed to exploitation in the long run if low productivity is common enough,
and/or bad incumbents are rare enough. Second, even if payo¤ reinforcement
learning can be exploited by bad incumbents, learning will take place among
voters and sophisticated incumbents will adjust to this learning. The result is
a selection dynamics that places a cap on exploitation of non-rational voters.
This constraint will be weaker the more bad incumbents value immediate
rents. In the stable state, behavior deviates from the equilibrium of the
electoral agency model, but not as much as with unsophisticated incumbents.
Conclusion
In his great book on capitalism and democracy, Joseph Schumpeter (1996:262)
notes how "...the typical citizen drops down to a lower level of mental per-
formance as soon as he enters the political eld. He argues and analyzes
in a way which he would readily recognize as infantile within the sphere of
his real interests. He becomes primitive again. His thinking is associative
and a¤ective ... [This] may prove fatal to the nation." Current models of
electoral agency derive from a radically di¤erent idea; utilizing the standard
assumptions of rational and self-regarding behavior.
Our experimental design has sought to eliminate the impact of social
preferences and intentions ("a¤ections") on voting behavior, in order to focus
more clearly on non-rational ("associative") forms of learning. We found that
simple payo¤ reinforcement learning explains subjects voting behavior well
in our electoral agency experiment.17
Our simulations indicate that situations in which Bayesian updating is
strong and clear, also make payo¤ reinforcement push behavior towards the
equilibrium (which is "good for the nation" since selection and discipline
tends towards optimality). When Bayesian updating produces a less clear
cut answer, on the other hand, payo¤ reinforcement pushes behavior away
17The explanatory force of simple payo¤ reinforcement has been well documented for
market games, ultimatum bargaining and contribution games in Roth & Erev 1995.
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from equilibrium (which may be "fatal to the nation", since selection and
discipline does not work optimally). This movement away from equilibrium
is limited by sophisticated incumbents responding optimally to non-rational
voters. The less farsighted bad incumbents are, the further from equilibrium
behavior stabilizes.
For reasons such as these, we believe that observing voting patterns that
approach equilibrium behavior in eld data or, for that matter, in experi-
mental data, does not justify strong conclusions about data being generated
by a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Our results are limited to the basic elec-
toral agency model. However, the core mechanism of this simple model is
shared by more complex electoral agency models. Exploring the implications
of associative and a¤ective thinking more systematically could well benet
the development of electoral agency models.
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Appendix
[Figures A1-40 about here]
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Figure 1: Decisive voters and electorates; games 1 – 7. 
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Figure 2:  Decisive voters; games 1 – 5 and games 16 – 20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Simulation results; substantial update left panel, marginal update right panel 
(90% confidence intervals in grey). 
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Figures A1 – A20: Marginal update. Dotted line, production=00, dashed line, production=25, solid 
line, production=50. 
 
